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THE WAGES OF TAKING BAKKE SERIOUSLY:
FEDERAL JUDICIAL OVERSIGHT OF THE PUBLIC
UNIVERSITY ADMISSIONS PROCESS

Martin D. Carcieri'
In the Beginning, there was Bakke.**
I.

INTRODUCTION

University of California Regents v. Bakk/ remains a controversial decision. In Bakke, the UC Davis Medical School had
set aside up to 16 out of 100 seats in every entering class solely
for members of certain racial or ethnic minority groups. In his
controlling opinion, Justice Lewis Powell ruled that while such
a quota system violates the Equal Protection Clause of the 14th
Amendment, race and ethnicity may be used as "one element in
2
a range of factors" in determining admission.
Whatever else may be said of Justice Powell's opinion, it is
arguably consistent as a matter of political theory: the two key
principles on which he rested his decision, and with which he
instructed public universities to accommodate, embody quintessential liberal values. On the one hand, he was clear that for
several reasons it is the individual, not groups, who holds civil
3
rights such as equal protection. On the other hand, he ruled
that the promotion of diversity among the student body at pub4
lic universities is a compelling state interest. Through the
* Assistant Professor of Political Science, University of North Florida, Adjunct Professor of Law, Florida Coastal School of Law. J.D., Ph.D., University of California. I wish
to thank UNF General Counsel Karen Stone for her useful comments.
** Law School Admission Council, New Models to Assure Diversity, Fairness, and Appropriate Test Use in Law School Admissions (December 1999), at 5.
1. 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
2. !d. at 314.
3. !d. at 289-99. On individualism as a liberal value, see Paul Brest & Miranda
Oshige, Affirmative Action for Whom?, 47 STAN. L. REV. 855, 861-62 (1995); Martin D.
Carcieri, The Wages of Taking Bakke Seriously: The Untenable Denial of the Primacy of
the Individual, (forthcoming in the TENN. L. REV.).
4. See 438 U.S. at 311-12. On diversity as a liberal value, Mill, one ofliberalism's
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"whole person" approach, accordingly, Powell sought to allow
universities to advance educational diversity while avoiding an
undue burden on individuals whose immutable traits do not
earn them a preference. Both of these objectives could be advanced by the use of race/ethnicity simply as a tiebreaker to
6
"tip the balance" in close cases.
7
The Powell opinion has been criticized, and it is not clear
that educational diversity remains a compelling state interest,
8
if it ever truly was. Nonetheless, the ruling arguably constitutes a reasonable compromise between basic, conflicting lib-

great prophets, wrote that a liberal education is
[D]irected ... to a broad development of understanding over the widest possible area of knowledge; ... it is an education concerned not so much with
factual acquisition as with the quality of experience, with truth, not dogma,
with discovery in intellectual exploration and the release of individual potential.
F. W. GARFORTH, JOHN STUART MILL ON EDUCATION 18 (1971). When properly administered, diversity encourages toleration, a related liberal value. See e.g., CHRISTOPHER
ED LEY, NOT ALL BLACK AND WHITE 130, 141 (1996); Deborah C. Malamud, Race, Culture, and the Law: Values, Symbols and Facts in the Affirmative Action Debate, 95
MICH. L. REV. 1668, 1691 (1997).
There are, however, serious problems with the diversity rationale. One is the
lack of a coherent definition of the diversity in which there is a compelling state interest. Whatever that definition may be, if there is one, a second, related difficulty is the
dubious claim that universities are truly committed to the promotion of diversity. See,
e.g., Timothy Hall, Educational Diversity: Viewpoints and Proxies, 59 OHIO ST. L. J.
551 (1998); Carl Cohen, Affirmative Action in Higher Education: Preference by Race in
University Admissions and the Quest for Diversity, 54 WASH. U. J. URB. & CONTEMP. L.
43 (1998); Scott L. Olson, The Case Against Affirmative Action in the Admissions Process, 58 U. PITT. L. REV. 991 (1997); Eugene Volokh, Diversity, Race as Proxy, Religion
as Proxy, 43 UCLA L. REV. 2059 (1996). Even putting these problems aside, further,
the link between race preferences and the promotion of the state interest is a source of
difficulty. See, e.g., Corinne E. Anderson, A Current Perspective: The Erosion of A(
firmatiue Action in University Admissions, 32 AKRON L. REV. 181, 228 (1999); Jim
Chen, Is Affirmative Action Fair? Diversity in a Different Dimension: Evolutionary Theory and Affirmative Action's Destiny, 59 OHIO ST. L. J. 811, 814 (1998). Even some proponents of affirmative action concede this. As Bowen and Bok observe, for example, ·'it
would be an oversimplification to assume that all African Americans ... represent anything resembling one point of view." WILLIAM G. BOWEN AND DEREK BOK, THE Sl!APE
OF TI-lE RIVER 219 (1998).
5. See Akhil Reed Amar & Neal Kumar Katyal, Symposium on Affirmative Action: Bakke's Fate, 43 UCLA L. REV. 1745, 1751 (1996).
6. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 316.
7. See e.g., Hopwood v. Texas, 78 F.3d 932, 944 (5th Cir. 1996); Lino A. Graglia,
Professor Loewy's "Diversity" Defense of Racial Preference: Defining Discrimination
Away, 77 N.C. L. REV. 1505, 1509-11 (1999); Hall, supra note 4 at 592.
8. See Hopwood, 78 F.3d at 944-45; Wessmann v. Gittens, 160 F.3d 790, 795-800
(1st Cir. 1998); Eisenberg v. Montgomery County Pub. Schools, 197 F.3d 123, 130 (4th
Cir. 1999).
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eral values and is still widely admired over twenty years after
9
it was handed down. Accordingly, a basic premise of this article is that Justice Powell's opinion should be faithfully enforced. In spite of its problems, Bakke should be taken seriously.
Interestingly, there is a narrative among affirmative action
proponents that Bakke has been taken seriously, that public
universities have routinely followed the ruling in practice. Professor Olivas, for example, assures us that only "modest racial
10
criteria" are presently used in admissions decisions since "no
law school can afford to admit students who cannot do the
11
work." Thus, add Amar and Katyal, "diversity has a built-in
stopping point, an inherent limit on the amount of permissible
12
affirmative action." As Bowen and Bok explain, universities
are unlikely to overreach because "[t]he admissions practices of
colleges and professional schools are highly visible .... Life in
such settings has been described by using the analogy of the
13
fishbowl." Finally, Dworkin assures us, faculty and academic
administrators are trustworthy since they "are in no way beholden for power or financial suBpart to any of the communities
4
[that race preferences] benefit."

II.

THE PROBLEM: BAKKE HAS NOT BEEN TAKEN SERIOUSLY

Notwithstanding such rhetoric, it is now well documented
that Bakke has not been taken seriously. Race/ethnicity has become not simply one of many factors given equal weight in de-

9. As Olivas notes, "[T]he carefully nuanced Powell opinion has proven surprisingly resilient and supple over the two decades since" it was handed down. Michael A.
Olivas, The Social Science and Common Law of Admissions Decisions in Higher Educa·
tion, 68 U. COLO. L. REV. 1065, 1121 (1997). As Bloom adds, "Powell got it right in
Bakke, and ... his approach should be reaffirmed on the merits and not simply on the
basis of stare decisis." Lino A. Bloom, Hopwood, Bakke, and the Future of" thf Diversity
Justification, 29 TEX. TECH L. REV. 1, 65 (1998). See also Samuel Issacharoff, Bakke in
the Admissions Office and the Courts: Can Affirmative Action Be Defended?, 59 OHIO
ST. L.J. 669, 693-94 (1998); ROBERT POST, Introduction: After Bakke, RACE AND
REPRESENTATION: AFFIRMATIVE ACTION 13, 20 (Robert Post & Michael Rogin eds.,
1998).
10. Olivas, supra note 9, at 1092.
11. !d. at 1119.
12. Amar and Katyal, supra note 5, at 1776-77.
13. BOWEN AND BOK, supra note 4, at 286-87.
14. Ronald Dworkin, Affirming Affirmative Action, NY REVIEW OF BOOK.S, October 22, 1998, at 91, 101 (book review).
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terming admission to selective public universities, but rather
the main factor. In Hopwood v. Texas, for example, the University of Texas law school was proven to have placed far more reliance on African American or Hispanic ancestry than allowed
under Bakke. As the Fifth Circuit observed:
[T]he law school ran a segregated application evaluation process. Upon receiving an application form, the school color coded
it according to race. If a candidate failed to designate his race,
he was presumed to be in a nonpreferential category. Thus,
race was always an overt part of the review of any applicant's
file.ls

For many years, similar procedures were used at the Uni16
versity of California. In 1995, the year before Proposition 209
was enacted, the gap between the SAT scores of Caucasians
and Asians accepted to UCLA and UC Berkele~ and those of
7
Afro-Americans and Hispanics was 250 points.
This leaves
little doubt that race and ethnicity were relied on far more
than simply to "tip the balance" in close cases.
Such practices have also long been used at the University of
Michigan, where equal protection challenges to the admissions
processes at the undergraduate and law schools are currently
1
pending. R In 1995, for example, Lerner and Nagai reported a
230 point gap between the median SAT scores of successful
Caucasian and Afro-American applicants and a 130 point gap
between the median SAT scores of successful Caucasian and
Hispanic applicants to Michigan's undergraduate program. ~
1

15. Hopwood, 78 F.3d 932, 937 (1996). See also, Robert D. Alt, Toward Equal Pro·
tection: A Review of Affirmative Action, 36 WASHBURN L.J. 179, 191 n. 80 (19971 (as Alt
elaborates, "it [was] presumed that other institutions run similar programs, since expert testimony professed to that very fact in an attempt to vindicate the University of
Texas ... The Fifth Circuit was unimpressed with the 'but everybody's doing it' defense."). See also, Gaglia, supra note 7, at 1513-16.
16. See CAL. CONST. art. I, § 31.
17. See Michael W. Lynch, Affirmative Action at the University of Califbrnia, 11
NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y, 139, 148 (1997); STEPHAN THERNSTOM &
ABIGAILTHERNSTOM, AMERICAN IN BLACK AND WHITE 408 Tbl. 9 (1997). As Lerner and
Nagai observe of the 1995 UC Berkeley admissions statistics, "(t)he highest quartile, or
75th percentile score for African Americans is almost equal to the lowest quartile, or
25th percentile score for whites and Asian Americans." Robert Lerner & Althea K. Nagai, Affirmative Action in Undergraduate Education: The University of California
Berkeley,
1993-1995: A
Preliminary Report
(visited
Oct.
9,
1996)
<http://www.ceousa.org/htmllberkeley.htmi>.
18. See Gratz v. Bollinger, 183 F.R.D. 209 (E. D. Mich. 1998); Grutter v. Bollinger,
188 F.3d 394 (6'h Cir. 1999).
19. As Michigan professor Carl Cohen adds, "[i]n a system in which one point is
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In response to such disclosures, Bowen has insisted that
20
"(c)learly the decisions are not based on race alone." Such a
reply, however, simply avoids the point. No one claims that
given for an applicant's outstanding essay, 1 point is given for an applicant's exhibition
of state-wide leadership and service, and an applicant with an SAT score of 1600 receives 6 points more than an applicant with an SAT scores (sic) of 930, every applicant
with 'Underrepresented RaciaVEthnic Minority Identification' gets 20 additional
points." Cohen, supra note 4, at n.43 (reporting data from the Selection Index Worksheet of the University of Michigan Office of Undergraduate Admissions). See also,
Bloom, supra note 9, at 66, n.535; Alt, supra note 14, at 192.
Lerner and Nagai have also documented similar processes, in which race and
ethnicity have been used well out of proportion to the limited permission granted in
Bakke, at other selective public universities. See, e.g., Robert Lerner & Althea K. Nagai, Preferences in North Carolina Higher Education (visited Sept. 11, 2000)
<http://www.ceousa.org/html/nc.htmi> (190 point SAT gap between successful Black
and white applicants at UNC Chapel Hill in 1995); Robert Lerner & Althea K. Nagai,
Preferences at the University of Virginia: Racial and Ethnic Preferences in Undergraduate
Admissions,
1996
and
1999,
(visited
Sept.
11,
2000)
<http://www.ceousa.org/html/va2.htmb (190 point black/white SAT gap at lN in 1999);
Robert Lerner & Althea K. Nagai, Affirmative Action in Colorado Higher Education,
<www.ceousa.org/htmllcolorado.htmi> (visited Sept. 11, 2000) (205 point black/white
SAT gap at CU Boulder in 1995); Robert Lerner & Althea K. Nagai, Preferences in
Washington
Higher
Education
(visited
Sept.
11,
2000)
<http://www.ceousa.org/html/warp.htmb (220 point black/white SAT gap at the University of Washington in 1995).
Further, since the dominant use of race and ethnicity has filtered into elementary and high school admissions and transfer practices as well, there have now
been successful equal protection challenges at those levels. See, e.g., Wessmann v. Gittens, 160 F. 3d 790 (1998); Eisenberg ex. rel. Eisenberg v. Montgomery County, 197 F.
3d 123 (1999). See generally, Stephan Thernstrom & Abigail Themstrom, Race Preferences: What We Now Know, COMMENTARY, Feb. 1999, at 44.
These developments should come as no surprise. First, this dynamic has
taken place in other public contexts in which race/ethnicity was originally conceived as
but "one factor among many" in the allocation of scarce, valuable public benefits. As
Justices O'Connor and Kennedy, the centrist bloc on whom the future of public affirmative action arguably rests, have observed of the broadcasting license context, "race is
clearly the dispositive factor in a substantial number of comparative proceedings."
Metro Broadcasting v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547, 630 (1989) (5-4 decision) (O'Connor, J., dissenting). Second, the color coded application process is well established at selective private universities. As the Thernstroms observe of Bok and Bowen's own figures:
[A]among 1989 applicants to the five private schools studied intensively by
Bowen and Bok, only 19 percent of whites with combined SAT scores from
1200 to 1249 were admitted, as against 60 percent of blacks with similar
scores; in the next bracket up (1250-1299), 24 percent of whites but 75 percent of blacks were accepted. In these two brackets, then, the black acceptance rate was triple that for whites .... [In other words], black applicants
with scores around 1200 were nearly as likely to be accepted at Bowen and
Bok's five institutions as whites with scores of 1500 or better.
Thernstrom & Thernstrom, supra, at 45-46 (responding to BoK & BOWEN, supra note
4).

20. Quoting Ethan Bronner, Conservatives Open Drive Against Affirmative Action,
N. Y.TIMES, January 26, 1999, at A10.
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race/ethnicity is the only factor determining admission to top
public universities, for then we might expect to find illiterates
at Berkeley and Michigan. The problem is rather that
race/ethnicity has become the predominant factor in these
21
processes, and this is flatly inconsistent with the Bakke "one
of many factors" rule. As even Amar and Katyal concede,
"when a racial plus looms so much larger than other diversity
factors, an admissions scheme would, it seems, violate the let22
ter and spirit of Bakke." Such a concession, in passing, exposes
the fallacy of Amar and Katyal's earlier claim that whatever
"built-in stopping point" diversity may have, it is well outside
23
the limits of Powell's ruling. Likewise, it is now evident that
Olivas' assurance that universities cannot afford to admit students who can not do the work fails to justify current practices.
Even if we accept his claim, "whoever can do the work" is sim24
ply not the standard that Justice Powell announced.

III. HISTORICAL REVIEW
It is useful to ask how these practices have come about. As
Rosen observes:
(T]he gap between the test scores of white and black candidates is so stark that, to admit more than token numbers of
minority candidates, race must be used not as a "plus factor"
but as the decisive factor in case after case .... If racial "plus
factors" are not allowed to loom larger than other proxies for
diversity, if Bakke is rigorously applied, then the entering
class at Texas might be onl~ slightly less white than a color
5
blind system would produce.

As the Piscataway Brief adds, "[t]he tiebreaker prefer21. O'Connor spoke to such a claim in the broadcasting license context: "[t]he
Court's emphasis on the multifactor process should not be confused with the claim that
the preference is in some sense a minor one. It is not." Metro Broadcasting, 497 U.S. at
630 (5-4 decision) (O'Connor J., dissenting). Professor Cohen also addresses this confusion. See, Cohen, supra note 4, at 19.
22. Amar & Katyal, supra note 5, at 1777 n.142.
23. See id.
24. Olivas' claim is a variant of the fallacy that race preferences are defensible so
long as those preferred are "qualified" or "fully qualified' or "minimally qualified"
rather than best qualified for the benefits being distributed. For a response to this fallacy, see M. Carcieri, Ten Fallacies of the Affirmative Action Debate, 1 FLA. COASTAL
L.J. 386, 390-392 (2000).
25. Jeffrey Rosen, The Day the Quotas Died, THE NEW REPUBLIC, April 22, 1996,
at 21, 25.
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ence . . . would be highly inappropriate in university admissions .... [M]ore than just tiebreaking is needed to get more
than token minority representation in elite academic programs."26 As these comments suggest, mere token numbers of
minorities are simply unacceptable to many university officials.
Regardless of the limits Justice Powell imposed, his approval of
the diversity rationale has become a justification to ensure
proportional representation of minorities at elite public institutions. The Supreme Court, however, has never recognized proportional representation as a compelling state interest sufficient to justify race preferences in the allocation of public
benefits. In Metro Broadcasting, in fact, the O'Connor Four
foresaw that the diversity rationale "might be used to justify . . . unconstrained racial preferences, linked to nothing
more than proportional representation .... We cannot deem to
be constitutionally adequate an interest that would support
measures that amount to the core constitutional violation of
27
outright racial balancing." As Roberts and Stratton have thus
observed, "we are witnessing in the name of diversity the development of a new constitutional right to proportional repre28
sentation by race."
The weakness of Dworkin's assurance that public university officials are trustworthy since they are beholden to none of
29
the communities benefiting from race preferences is thus now
26. Charles Alan Wright, Douglas Laycock, & Samuel Issacharoff as Amici Curiae in support of Respondent, Piscataway Township Bd. Of Educ. v. Taxman, F.3d
1547 (3d. Cir. 1996), available at 1997 WL 626055 at 17 Westlaw (emphasis added).
27. Metro Broadcasting, 497 U.S. at 614 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). Justice Thomas would almost certainly agree, establishing a sitting majority with this view. See,
Adarand Constructors v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 240 (1995) (Thomas, J., dissenting).
More recently, the First Circuit in Wessmann, which was careful to distance
itself from the Hopwood ruling that diversity is not a compelling state interest, was
clear that proportional representation is likewise not a compelling state interest. See
Wessmann, 160 F.3d at 795-800. For other problems with proportional representation
by race as a goal of social policy, see Martin D. Carcieri, Operational Need, Political Reality, and Liberal Democracy: Two Suggested Amendments to Proposition 209-based
Reforms, 9 SETON HALL CONST. L.J. 459, 497, n.151 (1999).
28. P. ROBERTS & L. STRATTON, THE NEW COLOR LINE: HOW QUOTAS AND
PRIVILEGE DESTROY DEMOCRACY 128 (1995). For an example of how proportional representation by race and gender at prominent institutions is uncritically assumed to be
a constitutionally permissible if not compelling goal of social policy, see David B. Op~
penheimer, Carcieri's Self-Described "Progressive" Critique of the ACLU on Proposition
209: A "Conservative" Response," 39 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 1153, 1170 (1999). For aresponse, see, Martin D. Carcieri, A Progressive Reply To Professor Oppenheimer on
Proposition 209, 40 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 1105 (2000).
29. See supra note 14.
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clear. Perceived self interest comes in various forms, and justice is a powerful motivating idea. Thus, a combination of the
perceived need to purge collective guilt and a vision of social
justice as proportional representation are easily sufficient to
motivate those in power to break the law.
Once proportional representation of minorities at elite public universities effectively becomes the goal, further, its
30
achievement effectively requires de facto quotas. Even the
Brennan Four, who would have upheld the admissions program
at issue in Bakke, conceded that, "[f]or purposes of constitutional adjudication, there is no difference between [preferences
31
and quotas] ." Regarding University of California at Irvine's
more recent system of preferences, UC Irvine Chancellor Ralph
Cicerone has admitted that, "I think it was coming close to
leading us to a quota system." 32
Under the pressure to "get the numbers up," then, race has
transformed from "one of many" factors into the decisive factor.33 The constitutionality of the process has been sacrificed for
substantive political outcome. The end has come to justify the
means, and we now have exactly what the Civil Rights Movement was allegedly trying to move beyond, a racial spoils sys34
tem in the allocation of public benefits.
Yet even if we grasp the dynamic at work, it is still important to ask how universities could have escaped undetected for
so long. Greve answers, "universities [have done] everything in
35
their power to keep the data secret." Bloom adds that, "most
racial preference programs are operated in complete secrecy,
making it easy for the public to assume whatever it wants

30. See DARIEN A. MCWHIRTER, THE END OF AFFIRMATIVE ACTION: WHERE Do
WE Go FROM HERE? 146-47 (1996).
31. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 378 (Brennan, J., concurring and dissenting in part).
32. Quoted in A. Cohen, When the Field is Level, TIME, July 5, 1999 at 30, 32.
33. Like "mission creep" in military operations, this might fairly be called "factor creep," and the analogy to wartime is compelling. In his dissent in Korematsu v.
United States, 323 U.S. 214, 247 (Jackson, J., dissenting), Justice Jackson noted the
drift from the allowance of a curfew order in Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81
(1943) to the approval of an exclusion order in Korematsu.
34. Two observations from a prominent civil rights leader are relevant here:
"[T]he means we use must be as pure as the ends we seek." D. Ravitch & Abigal
Thernstrom, eds., The Democracy Reader 192 (1992) (quoting Martin Luther King, Jr.,
Letter from Birmingham Jail); "[I]n an effort to achieve freedom ... we must not ...
subvert ... justice. We must seek democracy and not the substitution of one tyranny
for another." !d. at 191 (quoting Martin Luther King, Stride Toward Freedom).
35. M. Greve, A River Runs Dry, Policy Review, April/May 1999, at 4.
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about the degree and impact of the preferences." Even race
preference advocates concede this. As the authors of the Piscataway Brief admit, for example, "the higher education community ... interpreted Justice Powell's test to make constitutionality depend on procedural mechanisms that conceal the
37
actual working of the affirmative action plan." Bok and Bowen's assurances that universities, operating in a "fishbowl,"
3
would not overreach even if they wanted to, x are thus exposed
as the obfuscation of a corrupt establishment. If admissions
committees have been operating in a fishbowl, it is a fishbowl
inside a locked room with no windows. As Sniderman and
Carmines thus observe:
There is an irony here. For the very criticism that is leveled at
the "old boys" network for permitting established elites to
conceal publicly indefensible choices under a veil of secrecy
has still more force applied to affirmative action. The Achilles
Heel of affirmative action, so far as it entails preferential
treatment, is precisely that it entails adjudication of qualifications by a small, privile~ed social group operating so far as
3
possible without scrutiny.
Yet there is even more. In spite of the measures designed to
ensure secrecy, individuals have occasionally uncovered and attempted to publicize evidence of such practices as color-coded
application files. University authorities, in turn, have taken
411
steps to retaliate against such whistleblowers. Thus we have a
vicious circle: abuse necessitates secrecy, which in turn enables
and reinforces abuse. Standards are stretched, this is lied

36. L. Bloom, supra note 4, at 66. As Professor Cohen observes, "documents in
which university preferential admissions programs are detailed are commonly hidden,
and as at the University of Michigan: "CONFIDENTIAL: INTERNAL USE ONLY." C.
Cohen, supra note 4, at n.23. As Alt adds, "hiring and admissions processes are virtually closed to public inspection. As such, universities can commit such flagrant acts of
color coding applicant files for years before the applicant becomes aware." Alt, supra
note 14, at 187.
37. Piscataway Brief, supra note 25, at 17. As Traub reports with respect to the
University of California, "one prominent supporter of affirmative action says that the
principle imperative of admissions departments in recent years has been 'opacity'." J.
Traub, The Class of Prop. 209, NY TIMES MAGAZINE, May 2, 1999, at 76.
38. See BOWEN AND BOK, supra note 4.
39.
P. SNIDERMAN & E. CARMINES, REACHING BEYOND RACE 55 (1997).
40. See e.g., Georgetown Law Student Disciplined, Will Graduate, CHRON.
HIGHER EDUC., May 29, 1991, at A2; R. Wilson, Student's Article Rolls Georgetown U.
Law Center, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC., April 24, 1994, at A33; F. Robles, Conservative
Law Student Brings Furor to Forefront, THE MIAMI HERALD, October 1, 1995, at lB.
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about and the lies upon exposure are covered up. As Pell notes,
accordingly, "it was not until state freedom of information laws
were used to obtain admissions documents from state schools
that it became clear just how far afield many schools had
,41
s t raye d .
We now have a sense of the scope of the problem. It is not
just that a Supreme Court opinion has been misconstrued.
Rather, we have witnessed the profoundly antidemocratic spectacle of unelected, unaccountable bureaucrats and academics
secretly imposing their view of racial justice on society and
42
then seeking to punish any exposure of the truth. The process
which purported to carry Justice Powell's ruling into effect has
thus become indisputably corrupt. Powell was aware of this
risk, and so was careful to insist that "constitutional limita43
tions protecting individual rights may not be disregarded." In
his attempt to give universities appropriate discretion to promote diversity, however, he felt compelled to assume good faith
on their part. While we can admire and sympathize with Justice Powell's confidence, this seems, in hindsight, to have been
the great flaw of Bakke. Although Powell hoped for principle,
what happened was politics, and the constitutional framers
could have predicted this. In drafting the Constitution, Madison, Hamilton and Adams did not assume good faith on the
44
part of those exercising public power. Rather, they designed a
system in which those exercising such power, which includes
the distribution of scarce, valuable public resources like seats
at selective state universities, would be checked by others exercising public power. In assuming good faith, Powell thus departed from the assumptions about human nature that guided
the framing of the Constitution, and the results are no longer a
secret.
41. T. Pell, Address at Hamilton College (Apr. 5, 1999). See also, Cohen, supra
note 4.
42. See Hall, supra note 4. See also, ALEKSANDR SOLZHENITSYN, LIVE NOT BY
LIES, THE DEMOCRACY READER, 207 (Diane Ravitch & Abigal Theinstrom eds. 1992).
43. University of Cal. Regents v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 314 (1978). As Professor
Cohen notes, "Powell was no simpleton. He realized well enough that the individualized way of taking race into account for which he was making some room might be
abused by unscrupulous administrators, transformed into systematic preference. Being
an honorable man, he began with the presumption that others would act honorably as
well." Cohen, supra note 4.
44. See THE FEDERALIST Nos.l5, 65 (Alexander Hamilton), No. 51 (James Madison); John Adams, The Prudent Constitutions of America, in THE PORTABLE
CONSERVATIVE READER 51-64 (R. Kirk, ed., 1982).
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IV. THE SOLUTION: FEDERAL JUDICIAL OVERSIGHT OF PUBLIC
UNIVERSITY ADMISSIONS

If we have clarified the problem, then what is the solution?
One response, of course, for which there is ample justification,
would be for the Court in an appropriate case simply to reaffirm the Hopwood ruling that educational diversity is not a
compelling state interest. While this might happen, our premise is that Justice Powell's Bakke opinion should be upheld and
45
enforced. After all, diversity is arguably consistent with First
Amendment values, and constitutional law has always been at
least as much a matter of the practical accommodation of conflicting interests as the reflection of perfectly coherent principles.46 So, let us take Bakke seriously, but ask, what are the
wages of doing so? What are the implications of an honest attempt to accommodate the individualist and diversity principles?
For reasons considered above, we must begin with the
premise that admissions committees cannot be trusted. There
is no reason to assume that they will act in the good faith that
47
Justice Powell presumed. In fact, there is every reason to expect otherwise. If the appropriate remedy for a closed process
48
which has yielded unconstitutional abuse is to open it, then
the logical consequence of taking Bakke seriously is suggested
in the Piscataway Brief, drafted by faculty at "ground zero" of
49
the affirmative action debate. As they wrote, "[u]niversities
could [operate] in ways that are readily administrable and judicially reviewable. ,,5o I therefore assert that taking Bakke seri45. Given the present Court's lack of any clear consensus on the issue, much
may depend on the outcome of the 2000 national elections, which if any Justices retire
soon thereafter, and who will be nominated to replace them. We know that the Senate
is evenly divided between Democrats and Republicans. The President will be forced to
nominate moderates to fill any Supreme Court vacancies, and so there is no way to
predict how any such nominees would rule on this issue.
46. See Bakke, 438 U.S. at 312.
47. See id.
48. As Dr. King observed, "[!]ike a boil that can never be cured so long as it is
covered up but must be opened with all its ugliness to the natural medicines of air and
light, injustice must be exposed, with all the tension its exposure creates, to the light of
human conscience and the air of natural opinion before it can be cured." See King, supra note 33, at 196.
49. James Traub, Testing Texas, THE NEW REPUBLIC, April 6, 1998, at 26.
50. Piscataway Brief, supra note 25, at 17 (emphasis added). The authors suggested this knowing there was a good chance that the Court would rule against the
Piscataway Township. Since their only hope of salvaging affirmative action in any form
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ously requires nothing less than federal judicial oversight of
the admissions processes at those selective public universities
wishing to use race preferences to advance educational diversity.51 This proposal, of course, raises many questions. This artde concludes by identifying and speaking to several of them.
V.

OBJECTIONS AND RESPONSE

It might initially be objected that the proposal simply calls
for more government, and in particular, more of the least democratic branch of government. I respond first, that it would be
disingenuous for modern liberals like affirmative action proponents to stand on the principle of minimal government. They
obviously favor activist government when it advances their
ends. In any case, since relatively few public universities are
selective enough to need race preferences to advance race diversity, excessive governmental intervention is not being advocated.
Yet it will be insisted that Justice Powell himself rejected
judicial oversight in this context. Instead, he stressed the importance of the academic freedom of universities in selecting
their student bodies, and commentators have underscored the
52
value of such institutional autonomy. As Loewy writes,

was to suggest a solution that is fair and principled, and not merely partisan, this proposal has the credibility of a statement against interest.
51. This assumes, of course, that selective public universities will still want to
use race preferences in admissions in the medium to long run, and this is far from certain. Beyond the influence of practices in post-Proposition 209 California, much may
depend on the impact on other states of two pending legal developments in Florida.
See, Cohen, supra note 4; Traub, supra note 49. One is the One Florida Initiative, Governor Jeb Bush's executive order replacing race preferences in public university admissions and race and gender preferences in public contracting and with race and gender
neutral measures designed to ensure diversity. See, P. Douglas Filaroski, All Eyes on
One Florida's Effect on Campaign, FLORIDA TIMES-UNION, March 11, 2000, at Bl. The
other is the success of the Florida Civil Rights Initiative (FCRI), a proposed state constitutional amendment roughly modeled on California's Proposition 209. While the
Florida Supreme Court ruled that the FCRI in its present form violates both the Constitutional and statutory provisions governing citizens' ballot initiatives, and so could
not be placed on the November 2000 ballot, FCRI sponsor Ward Connerly has vowed to
redraft the FCRI and place it on the 2002 ballot. See T. Csar, Connerly Postpones
Initiative on Race, FLORIDA TIMES- UNION, May 9, 2000, at AI. Nonetheless, some of
the equal protection challenges mentioned above may be in the federal courts for a few
years yet, perhaps prompting the Court to revisit the Bakke question for the first time
in over twenty years. The question may thus remain relevant, if not burning, for at
least a couple of years yet.
52. See Bakke, 438 U.S. at 314.
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"[m]erit ... is ordinarily determined by institutional needs."
Malamud adds that, "(i)n the logic of capitalism, the needs of
54
institutions, not individual desert, defines merit." As Bok and
Bowen instruct us, universities have "much broader purposes
than simply rewarding students who are thought to have
55
worked especially hard."
I respond first that Powell at least contemplated judicial
oversight where constitutional limits are disregarded. As he
wrote, "[s]o long as the university proceeds on an individualized basis, there is no warrant for judicial interference with the
56
academic process." Beyond this, however, the argument from
institutional autonomy simply begs the question. Even legislatures in our system are subject to judicial review to ensure that
they exercise the public power with which they have been entrusted consistently with the Constitution. A fortiori, the
nonelected bureaucrats and academics on public university
admissions committees are also properly subject to judicial
oversight. In distributing scarce, valuable public resources like
seats at selective public universities, they too exercise public
power and the facts show that they cannot be trusted to do so
in accordance with the constitution. Stressing that, "Constitu57
tional limitations ... may not be disregarded," Justice Powell
reminded us that public institutions in a democracy are not
58
autonomous from the Constitution. Since the presumption of

53. Arnold H. Loewy, Taking Bakke Seriously: Distinguishing Diversity From
Affirmative Action in Law School Admissions Process, 77 N.C. L. REV. 1479, 1492-93
(1999).
54. Malamud, supra note 4, at 1708.
55. BOKAND BOWEN, supra note 4, at 277.
56. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 319, n. 53.
57. /d. at 314.
58. In fact, the claim that public universities should be free to employ race (or
gender) as they see fit in the distribution of scarce, valuable goods is especially weak
since the argument from institutional autonomy is largely invalid even in the private
sector, which often has more legal autonomy in such matters. See, e.g., United Steelworkers v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193 (1979) and Johnson v. Trans. Agency, Santa Clara
County, 480 U.S. 616 (1987). Fifty years ago, businesses like law firms routinely told
minorities and women, like Sandra Day O'Connor, that they were unhireable because
of "institutional needs", i.e., their clients would not take a minority or female professional seriously. See, WILLIAM COHEN AND DAVID J. DANELSKI, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW:
CIVIL LIBERTIES AND INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS 403 (4'h ed., 1997). Though some may favor a
return to the days when the prerogatives of powerful institutions came first and the
civil rights of individuals to equal treatment came second, the 1964 Civil Rights Act
made such discrimination illegal. See, 42 U.S.C.S. § 2000(e). The Equal Protection
Clause, which likewise expressly protects individuals, demands no less.
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good faith has been systematically betrayed, the condition underlying the claim to institutional autonomy is not satisfied,
and any autonomy rooted in the authority of Powell's opinion
9
has been significantly forfeited. 5
Yet it might still be objected that there is no need for continuing federal jurisdiction because organizations like The
Center for Individual Rights, using the various freedom of information laws, will perform a "watchdog" function. Judicial intervention would thus be unnecessary except on a case-by-case
basis. Though he does not advance this particular argument,
Professor Bloom has offered a proposal consistent with it. In
his view, public universities wishing to rely on Bakke as authority to use race preferences in admissions should regularly
"publish sufficient data about the process to allow interested
and affected constituencies to make an intelligent assessment
60
ofwhat the institution is doing."
This is a sensible policy which would help make Bok and
61
Bowen's "fishbowl theory" a reality. However, while it would
certainly be a necessary component of taking Bakke seriously,
it is not clear that it would be sufficient. In their documented
zeal for proportional representation, admissions officials might
well risk an unconstitutionally large gap in the objective qualifications of successful applicants from different racial and ethnic groups, gambling that the lack of automatic oversight, the
cumbersome process of bringing a legal challenge, and the limited resources of groups like the CIR would effectively preserve
the status quo. We must therefore be prepared to do more.
Notwithstanding the existence of watchdog groups like the
ACLU and the NAACP Legal Defense Fund, after all, the federal courts properly retained jurisdiction over southern public
school desegregation where ongoing constitutional violations by
62
defiant public officials had been proven. If that process was
important enough for continuing federal jurisdiction, there is
no principled way to distinguish public affirmative action in
this regard. Public education and unconstitutional race discrimination are two of the most important concerns of any de59. Beyond this, the argument from institutional autonomy seems elitist insofar as any public university applicant whose family has paid taxes to support that university is entitled to an admissions process consistent with the constitution.
60. Bloom, supra note 9, at 67. For elaboration, see, nn.67-69.
61. See BOWEN AND BOK, supra note 13.
62. See Brown v. Board ofEduc. (Brown II), 349 U.S. 294 (1955).
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mocracy. Their intersection is especially worthy of close supervision.
Yet it might still be claimed that the courts should stay out
of the public university admissions process because powerful
institutions have ways of achieving their ends regardless of attempts to regulate them. Notwithstanding Justice Powell's controlling opinion, the argument would proceed, institutional resistance and inertia will ultimately win the day, and so we
should simply accept this "reality." Bok and Bowen have argued along these lines, warning that, "it is very difficult to stop
people from finding a path toward a goal in which they firmly
63
believe."
While this seems to have the allure of realpolitik, an argument based on raw power is simply an abandonment of democratic principle. We are reduced to the claim that the Constitution should be obeyed except by those powerful institutions
that do not wish to do so. Fortunately, such an argument did
not ultimately prevail when public officials in the South resisted the enforcement of civil rights like educational and voting access for minorities. In response to Bok and Bowen's claim
that such officials have ways of doing what they want, Greve
observes, "[t]rue enough; that is exactly why Southerners of an
64
earlier generation discovered literacy tests."
It might still be objected that even if judicial oversight is
theoretically justified, as a practical matter workable standards for such review could not be established. Any proposed
standard, it is true, could be attacked as arbitrary. Yet if oversight is necessary for fidelity to Bakke, as I have argued, then
we must simply do our best. Again, we know that we must create a compromise that honors and accommodates both the individualist and diversity principles, and so Issacharoff seems correct when he argues that the magnitude of preferences under
65
Bakke must be "modest." As the Brief thus suggests, "the preference could be limited to one standard deviation or fraction of

63. BOK & BOWEN, supra note 4, at 288. For slighty different reasons, Amar and
Katyal also suggest simply throwing in the towel: since "admissions committees often
inevitably know something about the race of an applicant ... it may make sense to
permit [them] to consider what they know anyway." Amar & Katyal, supra note 5, at
1773.
64. Greve, supra note 34, at 4.
65. Issacharoff, supra note 9, at 693-94.
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a standard deviation, on the primary admissions predictor."66
Thus, let us assume that public universities continue to use
the SAT as one of their primary admissions indicators. 5 7 Even
assuming a standard deviation of 5% at a university where the
mean SAT score is 1300 for Caucasians and Asians (and 400 is
the minimum possible SAT score), a 45 point differential between the mean scores of whites and Asians on the one hand
and those of the minorities receiving preferences on the other
would be the maximum allowed. If this still seems unfairly to
"exclude" promising minorities, we must remember two things.
First, 1255 would simply be the mean SAT score for all members of the minority groups receiving a preference, so that for
every minority admitted with a score of 1300, one could be admitted with a 1210. Second, a minority who scores, for example, 1180 and is still rejected under this arrangement from his
first choice university is hardly condemned to illiteracy. He will
unquestionably be accepted elsewhere, where he will likely ex66. Piscataway Brief, supra note 25, at 17-18.
67. It is sometimes objected that standardized test scores are illegitimate measures of potential. AB Chancellor Tien puts it, "merit can not be defined solely on the
basis of grades and test scores." C. L. TIEN, A Personal Perspective on Affirmative Action, Post and Rogin, supra note 9, at 379, 380. See also Olivas, supra note 9, at 106980, 1118; Lani Guinier & Susan Sturm, The Future of Affirmative Action: Reclaiming
the Innovative Ideal, 84 CAL. L. REV. 953 (1996) at nn.68-69; Yxta Maya Murray, Merit
Teaching, 23 HASTINGS CONST. L. Q. 1073, 1112 (1996).
This is contested, however, and even some supporters of affirmative action
concede some legitimacy to standardized tests. AB Issacharoff notes, "there is ample
evidence of the usefulness of index scores in law school admissions in terms of predicting at least first year performance." Issacharoff, supra note 65, at 676, fn. 16. Bok and
Bowen admit that, "in helping selective institutions screen out applicants who seem
unlikely to be able to complete the academic work, grades and scores are undoubtedly
of critical importance." BOK & BOWEN, supra note 4, at 25 (emphasis added). Brest and
Oshige also admit that criteria like standardized tests are fairly good predictors. Brest
& Oshige, supra note 3, at 857. See also, Adrian Woolridge, A True Test, THE NEW
REPUBLIC, June 15, 1998, at 18; Volokh, supra note 4, at 2064 n.12; Tamala M. Edwards, College Prep from Day One, TIME, July 5, 1999, at 32, 33.
Even if standardized test scores are not perfect indicators of promise, it must
be admitted that race is no better an indicator. Moreover, affirmative action proponents' position cannot be that SAT and LSAT scores are completely subjective indicators of excellence, for then they should have no difficulty with seats at Berkeley, Texas
and Michigan going to the lowest scoring rather than the highest scoring minorities,
and I have seen none of them admit this.
Yet it may still be objected that some universities are considering the elimination of standardized test scores in their admissions processes, relying only on grades
and extracurricular activities. I respond that it is not clear that this will be widespread, but if it is, a similar formula to that suggested by the Piscataway Brief could be
devised. The judges would simply look at whatever the admissions committees looked
at in attempting to gauge applicant's objective skills.
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eel. Furthermore, this will be true for those Whites or Asians
displaced by preferred minorities who score below the mean for
nonpreferred admittees at the first choice school. The assumption that one must attend Berkeley or Virginia or Michigan to
receive a good education and promising life prospects is unfounded, and this illustrates why university admissions constitute a relatively defensible context for the use of modest race
preferences: the burdens imposed on nonminorities are not as
severe as those imposed on them in the public employment or
contracting contexts. Whereas good jobs and lucrative contracts
are relatively scarce resources, there is no shortage of educational opportunities for students at the level of ability we are
considering.
This brings us full circle. It might finally be objected, as
Rosen suggested, that Bakke's rigorous enforcement would
yield only token numbers of minorities at top public universities.68 As a consequence, the argument would run, judicial oversight of the admissions processes at these institutions would
undermine the advancement of the compelling state interest in
educational diversity.
Taking Bakke seriously, however, reveals that this is not
the case. As Justice Powell wrote, "[t]he diversity that furthers
a compelling state interest encompasses a ... broad ... array
of qualifications and characteristics of which racial or ethnic
69
origin is but a single though important element." The assumption that substantial diversity is impossible without proportional representation of select races and ethnicities is thus
without foundation in Bakke, and appropriately so. Not only
does race not determine how one thinks, but there are perspective-forming obstacles like divorce, physical disability, early
family death, and poverty that many minorities have never
known yet which many whites have. Even to the extent that
race and ethnicity are important (though not strictly necessary)
elements in educational diversity, further, the rigorous judicial
enforcement of Bakke would simply redistribute many minorities to second- and third-tier institutions, promoting the diversity associated with race there. Where this "cascading effect"
70
occurs, as in post-Proposition 209 California, it is not clear, on

68.
69.
70.

See Rosen, supra note 24.
Bakke, 438 U.S. at 315.
See Cohen, supra note 4, at 30, and Traub, supra note 36, at 46.
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balance, that anyone has been treated unjustly.
VI. CONCLUSION
I have proposed the establishment of federal judicial oversight of the admissions processes at those selective public universities wishing to use race preferences to advance educational diversity under the authority of Bakke. Objections to this
proposal on grounds that it has drawbacks amount to nothing
conclusive. It is well documented, as we have seen, that constitutional limits are frequently disregarded when the public university admissions process is not effectively supervised. As an
instance of checks and balances, judicial oversight of this process would be consistent with the overall scheme of constitu71
tional democracy. Even if the judges are inclined to defer to
admissions committees' judgments, especially in close cases,
the very fact that a relatively disinterested third party is looking over the committees' shoulders should inspire them to take
Bakke seriously.

71. If one prefers to call our form of government a republic, Madison reminds us
that a republican form of government is one in which all public power is derived directly or indirectly from the people. See MADISON, THE FEDERALIST No. 39, supra note
43, at 241.

